CodeRabbit Security | AI Security Reviews & Deep Scans

api/invoices.tsIllustrative

1router.get('/invoices/:id', async (req, res) => {
2  const invoice = await db.invoices
3    .findById(req.params.id);
4  return res.json(invoice);
5});
6
7
8

Access control · High

No ownership check ties the session user to the invoice. Any signed-in user can read every invoice by iterating IDs.

IDOR

Object references checked across services, not just within one handler.

agents/support-bot.tsIllustrative

1const reply = await llm.complete(`
2  You are a support agent with tools.
3  Ticket: ${ticket.body}
4`, { tools: [refundTool, lookupTool] });
5
6
7
8

LLM security · Critical

Ticket text is interpolated into a tool-calling prompt. A crafted ticket can steer the agent into calling refundTool on another customer's order.

Prompt injection

Untrusted text flowing into prompts, tool calls, and agent decisions.

checkout/confirm.tsIllustrative

1const total = cart.lockTotal();
2await payments.charge(card, total);
3applyCoupon(order, req.body.coupon);
4await order.confirm();
5
6
7
8

Business logic · High

The coupon applies after the total is charged. Re-submitting the step refunds the discount against an already-captured payment.

Logic flaws

Abuse paths that only appear when you reason about what the code is meant to do.

search/query.tsIllustrative

1const sort = sanitizeHtml(req.query.sort);
2const rows = await db.raw(
3  `SELECT * FROM repos ORDER BY ${sort}`
4);
5
6
7
8

Data flow · Critical

Input is escaped for HTML, not SQL, one file upstream. The ORDER BY concatenation stays injectable.

Injection chains

Tainted input traced through helpers and layers to the query it finally reaches.

preview/image.tsIllustrative

1const { url } = req.body;
2const img = await fetch(url);
3res.type('png').send(await img.buffer());
4
5
6
7
8

Server side · High

A user-supplied URL is fetched server-side. Internal endpoints, including cloud metadata, become reachable.

SSRF

Request builders that let user input steer internal traffic.

wallet/withdraw.tsIllustrative

1const balance = await wallet.balance(user);
2if (balance >= amount) {
3  await wallet.debit(user, amount);
4}
5
6
7
8

Concurrency · High

Balance check and debit are not atomic. Two parallel withdrawals both pass the check and the account goes negative.

Race conditions

Check-then-act windows an attacker can win with parallel requests.

api/invoices.tsIllustrative

1router.get('/invoices/:id', async (req, res) => {
2  const invoice = await db.invoices
3    .findById(req.params.id);
4  return res.json(invoice);
5});
6
7
8

Access control · High

No ownership check ties the session user to the invoice. Any signed-in user can read every invoice by iterating IDs.

IDOR

Object references checked across services, not just within one handler.

agents/support-bot.tsIllustrative

1const reply = await llm.complete(`
2  You are a support agent with tools.
3  Ticket: ${ticket.body}
4`, { tools: [refundTool, lookupTool] });
5
6
7
8

LLM security · Critical

Ticket text is interpolated into a tool-calling prompt. A crafted ticket can steer the agent into calling refundTool on another customer's order.

Prompt injection

Untrusted text flowing into prompts, tool calls, and agent decisions.

checkout/confirm.tsIllustrative

1const total = cart.lockTotal();
2await payments.charge(card, total);
3applyCoupon(order, req.body.coupon);
4await order.confirm();
5
6
7
8

Business logic · High

The coupon applies after the total is charged. Re-submitting the step refunds the discount against an already-captured payment.

Logic flaws

Abuse paths that only appear when you reason about what the code is meant to do.

search/query.tsIllustrative

1const sort = sanitizeHtml(req.query.sort);
2const rows = await db.raw(
3  `SELECT * FROM repos ORDER BY ${sort}`
4);
5
6
7
8

Data flow · Critical

Input is escaped for HTML, not SQL, one file upstream. The ORDER BY concatenation stays injectable.

Injection chains

Tainted input traced through helpers and layers to the query it finally reaches.

preview/image.tsIllustrative

1const { url } = req.body;
2const img = await fetch(url);
3res.type('png').send(await img.buffer());
4
5
6
7
8

Server side · High

A user-supplied URL is fetched server-side. Internal endpoints, including cloud metadata, become reachable.

SSRF

Request builders that let user input steer internal traffic.

wallet/withdraw.tsIllustrative

1const balance = await wallet.balance(user);
2if (balance >= amount) {
3  await wallet.debit(user, amount);
4}
5
6
7
8

Concurrency · High

Balance check and debit are not atomic. Two parallel withdrawals both pass the check and the account goes negative.

Race conditions

Check-then-act windows an attacker can win with parallel requests.

api/invoices.tsIllustrative

1router.get('/invoices/:id', async (req, res) => {
2  const invoice = await db.invoices
3    .findById(req.params.id);
4  return res.json(invoice);
5});
6
7
8

Access control · High

No ownership check ties the session user to the invoice. Any signed-in user can read every invoice by iterating IDs.

IDOR

Object references checked across services, not just within one handler.

agents/support-bot.tsIllustrative

1const reply = await llm.complete(`
2  You are a support agent with tools.
3  Ticket: ${ticket.body}
4`, { tools: [refundTool, lookupTool] });
5
6
7
8

LLM security · Critical

Ticket text is interpolated into a tool-calling prompt. A crafted ticket can steer the agent into calling refundTool on another customer's order.

Prompt injection

Untrusted text flowing into prompts, tool calls, and agent decisions.

checkout/confirm.tsIllustrative

1const total = cart.lockTotal();
2await payments.charge(card, total);
3applyCoupon(order, req.body.coupon);
4await order.confirm();
5
6
7
8

Business logic · High

The coupon applies after the total is charged. Re-submitting the step refunds the discount against an already-captured payment.

Logic flaws

Abuse paths that only appear when you reason about what the code is meant to do.

search/query.tsIllustrative

1const sort = sanitizeHtml(req.query.sort);
2const rows = await db.raw(
3  `SELECT * FROM repos ORDER BY ${sort}`
4);
5
6
7
8

Data flow · Critical

Input is escaped for HTML, not SQL, one file upstream. The ORDER BY concatenation stays injectable.

Injection chains

Tainted input traced through helpers and layers to the query it finally reaches.

preview/image.tsIllustrative

1const { url } = req.body;
2const img = await fetch(url);
3res.type('png').send(await img.buffer());
4
5
6
7
8

Server side · High

A user-supplied URL is fetched server-side. Internal endpoints, including cloud metadata, become reachable.

SSRF

Request builders that let user input steer internal traffic.

wallet/withdraw.tsIllustrative

1const balance = await wallet.balance(user);
2if (balance >= amount) {
3  await wallet.debit(user, amount);
4}
5
6
7
8

Concurrency · High

Balance check and debit are not atomic. Two parallel withdrawals both pass the check and the account goes negative.

Race conditions

Check-then-act windows an attacker can win with parallel requests.

Continuous code security powered by reason, not rules.

New threats don’t match old rules.

Attack patterns keep changing.

Fight AI with AI.

Agents that think like an attacker.

Continuous security monitoring.

Reduces noise by verifying.

Auto-repairs vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities only agentic tools surface

IDOR

Prompt injection

Logic flaws

Injection chains

SSRF

Race conditions

IDOR

Prompt injection

Logic flaws

Injection chains

SSRF

Race conditions

IDOR

Prompt injection

Logic flaws

Injection chains

SSRF

Race conditions

How it works

Two ways to scan.

PR scans

Deep scans

Your attack surface, visualized and contextualized.

Real risk, not noise.

Reachability

Exploitability

Blast radius

FAQ

Continuous code security powered by reason, not rules.

New threats don’t match old rules.

Attack patterns keep changing.

Fight AI with AI.

Agents that think like an attacker.

Continuous security monitoring.

Reduces noise by verifying.

Auto-repairs vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities only agentic tools surface

IDOR

Prompt injection

Logic flaws

Injection chains

SSRF

Race conditions

How it works

Two ways to scan.

PR scans

Deep scans

Your attack surface, visualized and contextualized.

Real risk, not noise.

Reachability

Exploitability

Blast radius

What does CodeRabbit Security do?

How is this different from a static analyzer?

How do you keep the noise down?

Does it fix what it finds?

Which platforms does it support?

Is my code safe with CodeRabbit?

How is it priced?

How do I try it?